

SCSUG

Smart Card Security Users Group

Defining Smart Card Security for the New Millennium

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Background

- ◆ The ultimate goal of smart card security is:
 - *proven robustness and correct functioning of every single card delivered to the card user*
- ◆ Chip security and Card life cycle security are the key links in this chain
- ◆ Becoming more important in view of --
 - multi-application cards
 - new applications demanding high security such as electronic purse
- ◆ Chip and card life cycle security are **non-competitive issues**

Credit Cards & Smart Card Security

- ◆ Currently, **Financial Payment Systems** (i.e., *credit card brands*) individually do smart card evaluations -- Unstandardized, possibly conflicting
 - No global process to systematically compare vendors' security claims
- ◆ Vendor's products may be subject to conflicting requirements, repeated and expensive evaluations by different Users
- ◆ Vendors are the drivers in identifying product security requirements

SCSUG's Approach

- ◆ **Smart Card Security Users Group (SCUSG):**
 - a **global, financially oriented industry group** including: American Express, Europay, JCB, MasterCard, Mondex, Visa
- ◆ **Coordinated by NIAP (US National Information Assurance Partnership)**
 - with the participation of other Governmental Bodies involved in the **Common Criteria Project** (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, UK)
- ◆ **Looking to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (ISO/IEC International Standard 15408) for security solutions**

Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation



- ◆ **ISO 15408 - Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (the “CC”)**
- ◆ **Currently endorsed by Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States; others in Europe & Asia in process of joining**
- ◆ **A process for evaluating security of IT products**
- ◆ **Desperately needed for smart cards**

What IS the Common Criteria ??

What the Common Criteria is --

- **Common structure & language** for expressing product/system IT security requirements (Part 1)
- **Catalogs** of standardized IT security requirement components & packages (Parts 2 & 3)

How the CC is used --

- **Develop** Protection Profiles and Security Targets -- specific IT security requirements for products & systems -- **Consumers then use them for decisions**
- **Evaluate** products & systems against known & understood requirements → **CONFIDENCE**

Common Criteria Concepts (1)

The CC defines two types of
IT Security Requirements:

Functional Requirements

- for defining security behavior of the IT product or system:
- implemented requirements become security functions

Assurance Requirements

- for establishing confidence in Security Functions:
- correctness of implementation
- effectiveness in satisfying objectives

CC Concepts (2)

Evaluation Assurance Levels

(Basis for Mutual Recognition)

EAL	Name	OB/IT*
EAL1	Functionally Tested	
EAL2	Structurally Tested	C1 - E1
EAL3	Methodically Tested & Checked	C2 - E2
EAL4	Methodically Designed, Tested & Reviewed	E3
EAL5	Semiformally Designed & Tested	B2- E4
EAL6	Semiformally Verified Design & Tested	B3 - E5
EAL7	Formally Verified Design & Tested	A1 -E6

CC Concepts (3)

The PP & ST

◆ Protection Profile -

- Statement of User's Security Requirements
- Standard format, catalog of concepts & requirements
- Implementation independent

◆ Security Target

- Vendor creates to show how their product meets requirements
- Implementation specific (= product)

SCSUG's goals re CC

- ◆ Specify “Protection Profiles” for **chip and operating system security** based on the Common Criteria (ISO 15408) -- application independent
- ◆ Provide financial industry chip/card **testing expertise** to national schemes to aid rigorous industry-acceptable lab accreditation and testing standards.
- ◆ Use **accredited Common Criteria Labs** for the evaluation of vendor products against the defined profiles
- ◆ Agree a minimum set of **product evaluation guidelines** that produce reusable results

SCSUG's CC-based Protection Profile

- ◆ SC-PP covers basic **application-independent platform**, including **chip & operating software**:
 - single or multiple applications supported
 - fixed or the new reconfigurable technologies
- ◆ Evolved from earlier work by each payment system, others
- ◆ NOTE: SC-PP's card security specs not limited to financial applications; threats/requirements generally applicable to “**sensitive applications**”

Threats Addressed by SC-PP

- ◆ **Physical attacks**
 - e.g. probing, manipulation, modification
- ◆ **Logical attacks**
 - e.g. bad data, illegal program loading
- ◆ **Access control**
 - e.g. invalid access, impersonation
- ◆ **Unanticipated Interactions**
 - e.g. unallowed functions

More Threats Covered by SC-PP

- ◆ **Cryptographic attacks**
- ◆ **Information monitoring**
 - e.g. info “leakage”
- ◆ **Miscellaneous**
 - e.g. environmental stress, repetitive or linked attacks
- ◆ **TOTAL THREATS: 23, all usage-oriented**

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A Few of the 43 CC Functional Requirements in SC-PP

FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms

FAU_LST.1 Audit list generation

FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation

FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access

FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation

FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control

FDP_IFC.1 Information flow control

FDP_RIP.1 Residual information protection

FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity

A Few More SC-PP Security Functions

FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling

FIA_UAU.7 Protected authentication feedback

FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior

FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state

FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack

FPT_RCV.3 Automated recovery without undue loss

FPT_RPL.1 Replay detection

FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the Security Policy

FTP_ITC.1 Inter-function trusted channel

SC-PP

Key Points

- ◆ Developed by a **USER COMMUNITY** (credit card brands / payment systems) to express their security requirements
- ◆ Intended as a **communications tool** with chip/card vendors and others
- ◆ Also intended as a basis for **CC security evaluation** to meet these users' needs
- ◆ Assurance level: **EAL4+**
 - Adds Design Modularity & stronger Vulnerability Analysis

SC - Protection Profile Current Status

- ◆ Public draft was posted for 3-month comment period until January 31
- ◆ PP now completely revised to **Version 2.0**, ready for CC Lab evaluation, will be internationally registered when complete
- ◆ To become a **NIST Recommendation**

NOTE:

*SC-PP also called out as security basis for
GSA's Smart Access Common ID Card RFP
(see Section J.7, Required Standards)*

Other SCSUG Activities

- ◆ **Helping National Evaluation Schemes:**
 - CC Evaluation Lab accreditation criteria (qualifications, equipment, procedures)
 - Evaluation methods to be used by labs
- ◆ **Working with Semiconductor & Card vendors (e.g., SSVG)**
 - to achieve agreement on common requirements & evaluation approaches

For More Information:

<http://csrc.nist.gov/cc/sc/sclist.htm>

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**Copies of Slides available at:
<http://csrc.nist.gov/cc> -- smart cards**